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The Politics of Environmentalism in Modern Day China 
 
William Labate 
Introduction 
 
Over the past few decades the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) has experienced 
breathtaking growth and development. Millions of 
Chinese have risen out of poverty while China has 
experienced one of the largest rural to urban 
migrations in history. Most economists predict that 
China’s growth will outpace even the dynamic 
United States economy. There is, however, a 
tradeoff for all of this growth, urbanization, and 
modernization within China. A byproduct of this 
prosperity has been the destruction of China’s 
environment for the sake of continued economic 
growth. The most obvious issue is that China is the 
largest emitter of greenhouse gasses in the world, 
which of course contributes to global warming. 
While greenhouse gas emissions are not a 
contentious issue for the average Chinese citizen, 
there are many issues which are, ranging from large 
scale air pollution to local land confiscations. The 
focus of this paper are these underlying 
environmental issues which have large implications 
for individuals and civil society. Because these 
issues are so prevalent, individuals and groups seek 
to remedy them through environmental activism. In 
any democratic country this activism would take 
the shape of active NGOs and individuals lobbying 
their government to implement effective 
environmental policies. By the nature of China’s 
political system, this activism takes quite a different 
shape.  
The objective of this paper is to examine the 
limits of environmental activism set by the 
government and how Chinese civil society attempts 
to operate within those guidelines. The paper wants 
to show that the PRC does not operate with a rigid, 
top down structure, and that there are in fact many 
variations in priorities, actions and outcomes 
between the different levels of the Chinese 
government. It examines the barriers that activists 
encounter and the most successful methods that 
they employ to overcome them. Using these 
methods this paper suggests several ways that 
activists might want to employ in order to be 
successful in the future.  Since China is not an ideal 
place for environmental activists, this paper also 
attempts to offer several policy prescriptions for the 
PRC to better address environmental and other 
concerns both before and after they emerge. Some 
of these prescriptions are unlikely to be 
implemented at the present time, but can be 
pursued in the long run while still maintaining 
China’s current style of government.  
In China, environmental activism must be 
carefully constructed to fit into the Chinese 
government structure to avoid being rebuked. The 
Chinese government is dominated, of course, by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which operates 
party cells at every single level of government. The 
central communist party bureau sets economic, 
political, and social guidelines for the rest of the 
country to follow. To a limited extent, the central 
party sets environmental policy as well for issues of 
national concern like carbon intensity, certain 
standards, reforestation, etc. Still, many 
environmental problems are of a regional and local 
nature and are solved locally which we will see 
with our case studies (with the last being an 
exception).  What this paper also looks at is how 
the PRC is not a monolithic one-party state with 
directives coming from the top and reaching the 
bottom in the same form. Every regional and even 
local party branch has different styles and priorities 
as will be seen in this paper. A directive from a 
higher level of government doesn’t always get 
implemented the way it is intended. The lower level 
of government might want to tailor it to further 
their own priorities or ignore it all together if it 
contradicts their goals. This kind of internal dissent 
cannot be tolerated for issues of high priority, but 
for low priority issues it is permitted. 
Environmental issues are of a relatively low 
priority compared to issues like economics or 
security. When George Bush asked Hu Jintao what 
kept him awake at night and he replied, the worry 
of “creating 25 million new jobs a year.”1 If it 
means ignoring the protection of the environment 
in order to prevent the creation of millions of 
jobless youth, the Chinese government will do so. 
Yet, meeting these economic targets have been, and 
will be the highest priority in China for a while. 
Creating these jobs will be worth the environmental 
externalities because the CCP judges 
unemployment as the most dangerous issue. 
Despite this, there has been a general backlash from 
                                                             
1 “Reassessing George Bush.” 
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the Chinese citizenry for not having stricter 
environmental standards.  The national and regional 
governments have attempted to placate these 
demands by implementing stricter standards and 
improving environmental quality but only to a 
limited extent. If China’s environment degrades in 
a more rapid fashion, citizen displeasure might 
move environmental issues to a higher priority. 
Due to the nature of its political system, the 
PRC and its citizens must reconcile how 
environmental activists can operate in an 
authoritarian, one-party state. The environmental 
regulations that the CCP write are the law of the 
state and are expected to be followed. By 
challenging those laws or lack thereof, 
environmental activists might be seen as opposing 
the CCP and by extension, the state. Even by 
framing activism as non-political concerning only 
environmental issues, it is easy to see how that can 
be extended to being considered a political issue as 
well. Despite this, the PRC has loosened its grip on 
civil society since the days of Mao. In the past few 
decades, civil society and the press have been given 
much more freedom to operate in many more areas 
than before. Though there are still many restrictions 
that the government places on communication and 
the internet that restrict NGOs from organizing. 
Additionally, in most places NGOs have to be pre-
approved in order to operate which severely 
hampers the emergence of new NGOs around 
various issue areas. If an issue is too controversial 
or the government thinks that the organization will 
pose a threat to its rule, the government does not 
have to grant it recognition. This lack of legal status 
gives the government an excuse to suppress their 
activities if needed. It is still a challenge for NGOs 
and individuals to pinpoint the boundaries that the 
state sets forth for them in their activism. Where the 
state puts these boundaries and the methods for 
how civil society determines their location are what 
the case studies in this paper examine in great 
detail. I will explore these issues in the following 
three case studies of environmental activism in 
China. 
The first case study examines the Green 
Garden conflict in Shanghai during the 1990s. In 
two instances, the local government wanted to build 
a structure in the middle of the green area in the 
Green Garden Village. According to the municipal 
regulations, green area is supposed to be preserved 
for the people of the village and not to be built up. 
The residents of the village attempted to assert their 
environmental rights by applying pressure to the 
local and city governments as well as different 
regulatory agencies to revoke the permit. The local 
government, however, sought to prevent the 
protesters from succeeding by manipulating 
existing regulations. This case study reveals how a 
local government interacts with an organized and 
coordinated environmental protest movement who 
uses their own laws against them. It also is intended 
to reveal how far protesters can go before they go 
outside the limits of non-political issues. In addition 
to the government-protester interaction, there are 
also several rule of law failures on the part of the 
government and bureaucracies which are examined. 
The use of journalists and print media also play a 
role in channeling support for the movement. 
Finally several policy prescriptions are issued to 
encourage consistent applications of regulations 
and clearer land laws. 
The second case study moves to the municipal 
level of government of Shanghai and the conflict 
over the Jiangwan Marshlands. The government 
wanted to drain the marsh and develop the area in 
order to accommodate the fast growing city. There 
were many Shanghai residents who did not want 
the marshlands to disappear at all since they are a 
vital green space which offers a prime place to bird 
watch. The fight to preserve the marshlands was led 
by an illegal and unregistered NGO, the Shanghai 
branch of WWF. The residents, many of them who 
were part of this NGO organized meetings and 
petitions against the building. They primarily used 
the internet as their chief medium of 
communication to organize but due to their illegal 
status, the government was able to step in and shut 
them down. Ultimately their efforts failed with only 
a small part of the marshland preserved and the rest 
build on. This case study is intended to show how 
the government handles dissent from illegal NGOs 
at a larger level of government. It also highlights 
how the internet can be used to organize protesters 
and how the government responds to that medium. 
Finally, it shows how the government out rightly 
prioritizes economic growth over the preservation 
of green space.  
The third study is the dam project on the Nu 
River in which a legal NGO, the Green 
Environmental Volunteers (GEV), managed to 
prevent this project from being constructed. The 
study examines the favorable NGO climate in 
Beijing and how NGOs can operate with a reduced 
fear of persecution. Establishing bonds and 
connections were crucial in the study since the 
GEV was able to collaborate with NGOs from the 
other side of the country to collect data and raise 
public opinion. Another interesting factor was the 
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fact that the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
was on the side of the NGOs and assisted them in 
the form of giving information. The fissures 
between different parts of the central government 
will be analyzed as well as effective strategies to 
increase cooperation between NGOs. 
Several factors went into the methodology of 
selecting these three case studies. At the most 
general, the cases were selected for their different 
levels of analysis with the Green Garden village 
being at the most local level, Jiangwan marshlands 
at the municipal/regional level and the Nu River at 
the regional/national level. It is necessary to see 
how at all levels the government interacts with 
environmental activism and how different priority 
levels affect that interaction (i.e. issues of national 
priority are more critical that regional/local). The 
form of advocacy is also another critical factor into 
determining the case studies. The Green Garden 
case was driven primarily by a few motivated 
individuals, the Jiangwan case with a loosely 
organized illegal NGO, and the Nu River with 
recognized and more organized NGOs. The rising 
importance of the internet is also important to 
examine with it playing a big role in the Jiangwan 
study. Each study examines a difficult hurdle that 
Chinese civil society has to overcome like rule of 
law failures (Green Garden), NGO recognition and 
internet censorship (Jiangwan), and NGO 
collaboration (Nu River). Two were big successes 
but another was a failure (Jiangwan) which is 
significant because these protests do fail on many 
occasions. What they all have in common is the 
PRC putting economic issues ahead of 
environmental ones. They all examine fissures and 
divergent interests at the different levels showing 
that the PRC is not a unitary actor both within and 
between levels of government. Each case study 
shows how the government attempts to clamp down 
on activists and stifle their dissent with varying 
results. Finally each one identifies the pitfalls that 
activists have to avoid in order for them to be 
effective in an authoritarian state. 
 
Case Study #1: Individual Activism in the 
Shanghai Green Gardens  
 
This first case study examines the conflict 
between residents and the local government over 
construction in the green space of the Green Garden 
New Village in Shanghai. In an effort to address 
environmental decay and degradation inside 
Chinese cities, several municipalities embarked on 
urban renewal campaigns during the 1990s. The 
Green Garden New Village in Shanghai was one 
such initiative designed to resettle residents from 
the city center to new residential communities 
closer to the city’s periphery. Regulations 
established when constructing these villages 
mandated that 10.16 percent of the village’s land 
area is comprised of green space. Green Garden 
village was comprised of 12 apartment blocks with 
a total of 10,000 residents surrounding and 8,000 
square meter park. Residents were relocated from 
their dwellings in their traditional neighborhoods, 
or “lilong,” and moved to these new villages. Many 
of the 12 housing blocks consisted of residents 
from several different lilong but a several of the 
blocks had been “collectively resettled” with 
residents all from the same lilong.2 
The individual villages of the Shanghai 
municipality are composed of a series of different 
divisions managing affairs at the most local level. 
Theoretically, the most powerful citizen 
organization is the Resident’s Committee 
comprised of local residents which is supposed to 
represent their interests to the local government. In 
reality, the members of this organization also must 
be members of the local cells of the CCP so they 
largely represent the party’s interest instead.3 The 
Residents’ Committee, which is supposed to be 
politically autonomous, is in actuality held 
accountable to the Street Council which is the most 
basic form of local governance. This is a good 
example of how the CCP uses organizations which 
are supposed to be representing citizen interests, to 
represent their interests. With housing being 
commercialized and many of the tasks of a landlord 
moving from the responsibility of the government 
to real-estate management companies, the city of 
Shanghai decided to set up home-owners’ 
committees in 1997. These committees were 
assigned one to each block and were designated to 
handle concerns between residents and the real-
estate management company. The real estate 
management companies, although seemingly 
independent from government, exist to serve the 
government’s interests and are extensions of their 
power. It is a good example of China’s “Red 
Capitalism,” or state direction of economic entities. 
Beneath all of these organizations are informal 
community associations of citizens who live in the 
                                                             
2 Zhu, Jiangang. "Not against the state, just protecting  
   residents' interests," 155. 
3 Ibid. 
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area and have common interests, like the Elderly 
Association.4  
The first major occurrence of green space 
destruction in Green Garden came when a real-
estate developer obtained a permit to build a 
structure in the middle of the village park in 1993. 
After the construction began, it was discovered by a 
group of elderly woman who spread the news 
through their informal associations within the 
community. They reported this violation to the 
Residents’ Committee who then notified the Street 
Council and the real-estate developer. The 
residents, through their local associations, wrote a 
series of complaint letters to the company which 
were all ignored. At the time, the home owners’ 
committees had not been created so the residents 
turned to another village resident named Shen Xin 
who agreed to help them.  
Shen carefully constructed an advocacy 
strategy that was both effective in getting the 
residents’ argument across and not getting him 
arrested. He needed to carefully define a reason to 
advocate for the protection of the green space that 
did not appear to go against the party or the 
government so their actions would not be 
suppressed. Shen framed his complaints in order to 
convey that residents were seeking to “protect their 
environmental rights” according to the laws passed 
by the government.5 To back up these rights, Shen 
used an “authenticating strategy,” which meant that 
he was not disagreeing with the official policy on 
environmental issues; he was simply compelling 
the government to adhere to their own laws. For 
example, the Shanghai Green Administrative 
Regulations explicitly say that “Building in public 
green space is forbidden.”6 The issue in this case 
was not that there was a lack in regulation 
protecting the environment; it was that existing 
regulations were not being enforced. Shen would 
use these regulations when discussing issues with 
officials and committees making it difficult for 
them to contradict government laws. With the lack 
of response from the Street Council, Shen took his 
complaints to the local Bureau of Urban Planning 
and the Bureau of Park Management who were 
charged with protecting the environment. 
Unfortunately for Shen, these two bureaus did not 
want to confront the other branches of the local 
government even though they supported his cause. 
This is a perfect example of rule of law failure 
                                                             
4 Zhu, 156. 
5 Zhu, 157. 
6 Ibid. 
since the bureaucracy should be acting according to 
the law and not trying to interpret the wishes of the 
party. Since local remedies were not producing the 
desired outcome, Shen managed to convince the 
residents to file a “collective complaint” to the 
Shanghai municipal government.7 What he was 
trying to do was draw attention to these abuses by 
the local government and show that enough citizens 
were displeased with this failure.    
Shen decided to become bolder with his 
struggle to preserve the park as the battle went into 
its second year. Restrictions on the media had been 
loosened during the past few decades on issues 
which are not too politically sensitive in nature. 
Shanghai’s newspapers began publishing stories on 
the Green Garden conflict which eventually came 
to the attention of many high municipal officials. 
The vice-mayor issued a statement that the situation 
should be handled “according to the law.”8 Though 
this was not a direct order to end the project, the 
Bureau of Park Management interpreted it as 
enough of a justification to order a freeze of further 
construction. Despite the freeze, the developer 
continued to build on the site in secret but the 
residents quickly discovered this violation. At this 
point, Shen made his most risky gamble yet when 
he ordered a few of the activists to break into the 
construction site and take down all of the 
scaffolding. When asked why he did such a thing, 
Shen replied that “The government had already 
forbidden the construction but they still went on, so 
what they were doing was illegal. We rushed into 
the site just to stop the illegal work. That’s why we 
dared to do it.”9 By framing it in this way, Shen 
was able to portray the struggle as the people 
against the development company and not the 
people against the government (even though they 
were essentially the same entity). After this incident 
as well as subsequent stories in the press, the 
Bureau of Urban planning revoked the construction 
permit and forced them to leave the park.   
Even with their initial victory to preserve the 
park, the residents of Green Garden had to fight for 
their environmental rights once more in 1997, but 
this time it was against the local government. The 
original plans for the park included the opportunity 
for the construction of a small, 135 square meter 
community center for the elderly. Despite these 
clear restrictions, the district government and the 
Street Council wanted to build a 2,600 square meter 
                                                             
7 Ibid. 
8 Zhu, 158. 
9 Ibid. 
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center for “old cadres” who were part of the 
movement which helped found the PRC. 10 Upset at 
this seizure of park lands, the residents protested 
that the park belonged to the community and were 
protected by the state under the law. The district 
government claimed that the park belonged to the 
state and they had the right to do with it what they 
wished. After the homeowners’ committee failed to 
reach an agreement with the Street Council, they 
once again turned to the media for support. After 
hearing about the story in the news, the municipal 
government put pressure on the district to 
compromise with the residents. Both the Street 
Council and the Homeowners’ Committee agreed 
to the construction of a larger community center in 
the park than what was detailed in the regulations, 
but only at the size of 650 square meters and not for 
cadres. The Street Council however, did not honor 
the agreement and decided to build a center for the 
cadres anyway at a size of 1,960 square meters.  
After discovering that their agreement was 
going to be disregarded, the residents were 
outraged. Some wanted to take radical action and 
destroy the construction site all together. This 
might be seen as a direct attack on the local 
government and a precursor to further violent 
actions. Shen knew this would turn many of his 
allies and the higher levels of government against 
the movement so he took a different approach. He 
led about 100 residents to the construction site to 
negotiate with a government representative. When 
nobody came to talk, Shen ordered the residents to 
pull down the barrier wall around the site and do 
nothing else. In a very precise and orderly manner 
Shen hoped that the local government would be 
“afraid of the resident’s potential ‘violence’” but 
avoided any outward example of real violence.11 
Seeing this display, the Street Council temporarily 
stopped construction only to continue soon after. 
As the builders continued construction on the 
expanded site, a few of the younger residents began 
to circulate a petition to end it. The petition itself 
wasn’t risky however, the residents wanted to 
submit it to the municipal authorities around June 
4th, a sensitive date because of the June 4th 
movement in China during 1989 democracy 
protests. Shen thought that this was too politically 
risky and wanted to get the government’s attention 
but “not let them lose face.”12 They submitted their 
petition to the government office in the evening in 
                                                             
10 Zhu, 159. 
11 Zhu,151. 
12 Zhu, 161. 
an attempt to avoid public attention. In this way, 
the Shen and his followers wanted to not seem like 
they were attempting to blatantly muster public 
support in challenging the government. The Street 
Council struck back and declared that a petition 
around the period of June 4th was illegal. They 
organized a public meeting with the Residents’ 
Council and retired members of the Communist 
party where they declared that Shen and his 
followers were acting out of selfish interests and 
not of that of the community. The Street Council 
even called the police to come and surround the 
building which served to intimidate the residents. 
Despite Shen’s efforts to “depoliticize the matter, 
the Street Council consciously treated the conflict 
as a political question.”13 
This intimidation by the police created fissures 
between the 12 homeowners associations and 
threatened the entire movement. Those who lived in 
the same lilong before they were moved showed the 
most commitment to the cause demonstrating how 
far old community ties went.14 Shen wanted to 
press on with the strategy of depolarization even 
after the Street Council tried to bribe him. He 
decided to continue to go through legal route by 
making repeated complaints to the Bureau of Park 
Management and the Bureau of Urban Planning 
about the illegal construction even though they 
were still under pressure from the street council not 
to act. He once again reached out to the media 
where he portrayed the issue as an environmental 
conflict and not as one against the government. 
Through this channel, the wider public as well as 
many municipal officials were made aware of the 
Green Garden issue. Shen even went further to 
bring a lawsuit against the development company 
in order to compel them to follow the law. In this 
way he hoped “to establish the rule of law instead 
of the rule by administrative government.”15 By 
focusing on the application of the law, Shen sought 
to use that as his cover from being accused of 
challenging the state. Shen claimed that the 
residents “defend the law. We are the people, so we 
stand on the side of the state. We know we are not 
against the state, but are just protecting our 
interests.”16 After facing all of this opposition and 
pressure from above, the local government decided 
to abandon the project. 
 
                                                             
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Zhu,163. 
16 Ibid. 
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Analysis and Policy Prescriptions 
 
The Green Garden incidents highlight several 
trends in how the government and citizens interact 
over environmental discourse in China. First, the 
citizens have a much larger amount of leeway to 
protest environmental issues which are usually of 
low political significance. In this particular case, 
the construction of a senior center in the middle of 
a village park does not have political significance 
outside the local level. Shen’s more radical actions 
like taking down the scaffolding and tearing down 
the wall around the construction site would not be 
tolerated if the issue in question was more 
sensitive. It did help that the city government did 
give tacit support for the goals of the protesters. 
Though Shen’s goal was to depoliticize the 
environmental issue in question, the July 4th 
petition threatened to contradict that stance. Shen 
was still able to avoid any uncomfortable 
statements near the anniversary but the government 
still tried to politicize the matter. This politicization 
of non-political environmental issues was an 
attempt by the street council to drag the issue into 
the forbidden zone of political dissent. After failing 
to effectively contradict Shen since his legal 
argument was stacked against them, they attempted 
to halt his protests from this approach. Shen was 
able to drag the protest out of that zone and back 
into that of non-political dissent. It was clear to 
Shen that in China, discourse is only tolerated 
within those limits of non-political dissent. Once it 
strays outside those boundaries it can be interpreted 
by the government at higher levels as a threat or 
challenge to their rule. Shen accurately knew that 
by talking about these issues in a non-political light 
was the only way to do so without fear of 
retribution. His success at bringing the issues back 
into this light was the reason why it ultimately 
succeeded and was not shut down by the police. 
The second trend was that the use of official 
channels and the media to effectively register 
dissent. Shen consistently quoted government 
regulations and the citizen’s environmental rights 
as justification to halt the destruction of the green 
space. By using the PRC regulations while talking 
to officials, Shen placed them in a difficult position 
since they would have to contradict laws written by 
the party and government. This authenticating 
strategy is useful since sometimes the laws for 
proper environmental protection are in place but 
they are simply not enforced properly. Shen also 
used completely legitimate petitions and collective 
complaints to alert the higher level of government 
that these abuses were occurring which led to 
pressure on the street council from above. 
Petitioning against abuses of the law by the 
government is actually encouraged by many leaders 
in China. Just recently Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
appeared at the nation’s top petition bureau to, as 
the New York Times describes it, compel “citizens 
to criticize the government and press their cases for 
justice” when laws are being violated.17 It should be 
noted that the petition bureau is not intended to 
make the government more liberal but instead make 
it more efficient. This criticism would have never 
been tolerated in the Maoist days of China where 
any criticism of government would be seen as a 
challenge to the state. Though today, it is still 
doubtful that issues of real political or economic 
importance would be accepted by the government. 
It is easy to sweep away Wen’s statements as 
political posing and rhetoric but for environmental 
issues the petition bureau can assist residents to a 
limited extent. Alone, the petitions that Shen 
submitted against the building weren’t very 
effective but combined with media assistance they 
managed to accomplish his goals.  
In both of the Green Garden conflicts the press 
played a critical role in disseminating information 
and for turning the people and municipal 
government to the side of the protesters. Though 
authoritarian, the PRC gives its press a certain 
(albeit short) amount of leeway to operate and 
report on stories. The media performs a certain 
amount of “self-censorship” to avoid potential 
“political minefields” while still being allowed to 
report on somewhat sensitive topics.18 Most 
politically sensitive issues are still off limits but 
since environmental issues are of a relatively low 
political importance, in both cases the media 
decided to pick up the story. In both Green Gardens 
cases a law, written by the CCP, was clearly being 
violated and the residents had legitimate 
grievances. Even in the case where the local 
government was involved, these newspapers 
circulated city-wide. By going against the paper, 
the local government would attract unwanted 
attention for its law-breaking from the public and 
from the municipal government. While the media 
cannot go against the party line it is usually 
acceptable to expose government abuses at the 
local level. This media publication was able to 
                                                             
17 Barboza, David. “China Leader Encourages Criticism  
    of Government.” 
18 Tong, Jingrong. “Press self-censorship in China: A  
    case study in the transformation of discourse,” 593. 
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attract enough attention from the municipal 
authorities that they in fact did apply pressure to the 
local government to compromise with the 
protesters. At the end of the first case after the Vice 
Mayor saw the news stories about the issues he 
even issued a veiled statement to support the 
protesters argument. The media also exposed the 
Bureau of Urban planning which after much 
reporting withdrew its permit for the building 
showing that the media has influence on the 
bureaucracy as well. After Hu Jintao rose to the 
post of CCP General Secretary in 2002, he wanted 
to promote more transparency in government 
through the media. It was Hu’s desire for 
transparency that actually encouraged media to 
“investigate allegations of corruption and 
mismanagement of local affairs by local 
officials.”19 Since these reforms took place after the 
Green Garden protest, they can be seen as the 
continuation of the expansion in the range that the 
media can operate in China. By no means should 
this be viewed as liberalization since the arena of 
political reforms is still out of the questions. The 
goal of these reforms is to make the government 
more efficient and not necessarily to give the press 
more freedoms. Though this means that now it is 
even easier to report on environmental violations in 
local government, the media is more constrained 
when criticizing existing regulations or the lack 
thereof. The media is always under the rather 
ambiguous Article 51 of the Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China which states that “The 
exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of 
China of their freedoms and rights may not infringe 
upon the interests of the state.”20 This is another 
vaguely worded clause that the government can cite 
when they want to limit the publication ability of 
journalists. In order to improve governance overall 
and encourage truly effective investigative 
journalism the CCP needs to loosen its grip on the 
press. If a particular project or program of vital 
national interest has problems with corruption or 
harms the environment, the media would be less 
likely to cover it because of fear of retribution. The 
media also might misjudge the “minefield” and 
may not even cover some stories where their stories 
might be totally in the bounds to report. Unless 
changed, the way that journalism laws are in place 
currently discourages the media from publishing 
                                                             
19 Rawnsley, Gary D.. "Media, Internet and  
    Governance," 124. 
20 People’s Republic of China. Constitution of the  
    People’s Republic of China. 
stories which might lead to better governance and 
environmental protection in general.21  
The third trend that was prevalent was the use 
by the local government of the ambiguous wording 
of laws and ignoring regulations to try to get their 
way. Ignoring regulations works in many instances 
around China when the opposition is not as 
organized or as cunning as Shen’s movement.  This 
rule of law problem can be abused in order to 
ignore environmental issues for the sake of 
progress and economic growth. China’s land laws 
also open up more maneuverability since their 
vague definition of land ownership allows for wide 
interpretation. It is really up to the citizens to call 
the government out on their abuses in order for the 
problem to get fixed in many cases. In other 
instances, the project may be of such national or 
regional importance that no amount of protest will 
convince the government otherwise since it can 
many times fall back on legal ambiguity if no law 
specifically forbids their actions. 
Both incidents in the Green Garden case reveal 
several weaknesses of the rule of law on the local 
level in China which must be addressed in order to 
avoid future protests. Pan Wei identifies 5 areas on 
which he bases rule of law; a neutral civil service, 
an autonomous judiciary, social consultative 
institutions, and freedom of speech.22 The most 
glaring failing of the rule of law in this first 
scenario was the lack of a neutral civil service. The 
local Bureau of Urban Planning and the Bureau of 
Park Management were constantly trying to 
interpret the will of the party rather than apply the 
regulations that were clearly in place. In general, 
this leads to arbitrary application of the law by the 
local bureaucracies both to the advantage and 
disadvantage of the municipal government. On one 
side, the government is disadvantaged because the 
regulations to preserve green space are being 
ignored. The whole purpose of the Green Garden 
village was to combat urban decay and lead to a 
green renewal of Shanghai by promoting more 
green space. When the local Street Council ignores 
regulations, it harms the goals of the municipal 
government and undermines their objectives. The 
advantage to this weakness in rule of law for the 
local (and municipal) government is that it can 
ignore the regulations when it is in their interest to 
do so. If an important structure needed to be built, 
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the party officials in the local government can 
simply put pressure on the civil service bureaucracy 
to issue them a building permit. Not only does this 
undermine the goals of the regulations, but it also 
leads to dissatisfaction among residents, many of 
which might not be as well organized as Shen to 
fight this. This dissatisfaction was prevalent during 
the Cultural Revolution due to the arbitrariness of 
regulations which resulted in many post-Mao legal 
reforms to encourage consistent application of the 
law.23 These reforms have gone far to ensure much 
consistency at the national and regional levels, but 
not at the local levels where they are harder to 
enforce due to a lack of oversight.24 
What the CCP should focus on is separating 
the party from government in order to ensure the 
neutrality of China’s civil service. Since Wei’s 5th 
criteria for effective rule of law, freedom of speech 
and to a larger extent, democratic accountability, is 
currently out of the question, neutrality remains a 
realistic near-term possibility. This isn’t such a 
radical proposal since “the party has announced as 
far back as 1978 11th party congress that they 
intended to separate the party from government.”25 
The party would still be able to maintain ultimate 
control since they would still write all of the 
regulations in the first place. This would mean that 
departments like the Urban Planning Bureau would 
enforce regulations to the letter no matter who is 
involved. Both bureaus involved in the first Green 
Garden case had to try to interpret the wishes of the 
vice-mayor when he said the situation should be 
handled “according to the law.” Under a neutral 
civil service, there would be less second guessing 
and tiptoeing around officials for fear of retribution. 
If the Chinese government wants more consistent 
adherence to regulations across the board they need 
to reign in these local authorities who repeatedly 
flout the rules. Not only would this consistency 
promote more economic growth and foreign 
investment, it would also go further in meeting the 
demands of Chinese citizens. Many Chinese do not 
say that they are dissatisfied with their form of 
government rather they “increasingly expect the 
legal system to protect their rights” according to 
Chinese law.26 The party would still be able to set 
the rules of the game by making this law but as 
long as the agencies and citizens play within those 
rules there should be fewer issues. Despite the 
                                                             
23 Peerenboom, 48. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
benefits, neutrality has faced many obstacles since 
it is hard to enforce at the local levels and the CCP 
enjoys its ability to selectively apply policy when it 
suits them.  
One of the several reasons that issues like 
those in the Green Gardens case arise, is because of 
the ambiguity of China’s land laws. The 
government has many reasons to impose a 
“deliberate institutional ambiguity”27 when crafting 
the laws. If this ambiguity is combined with the 
inconsistent enforcement of the laws which clearly 
delineate land ownership and land rights, the 
government has more room to adapt their policy to 
meet their own needs. The phrase “collective 
ownership” is deliberately left out of many places 
in the land laws in order to avoid public unrest 
when the land is used for the purposes of the state.28 
This concept of state ownership of land is a 
departure from the Mao-era policy of registering 
land under the local production team.29 Now many 
of the land use laws state that the land belongs to 
“the people” which the government interprets as 
“the state” in cases like the Green Garden. This has 
allowed local governments to take ownership of 
what should be resident owned land and use it for 
various development projects. In the case of Green 
Garden, residents exposed what the local 
government was attempting to do and used it as a 
rallying point to turn the public against it.   
Luckily for the residents, the government 
backed down at the end of the second case and the 
construction was halted. This clearly might not 
happen in other cases even when residents use 
similar strategy to Shen’s. What happens when the 
local government is less sympathetic or the central 
government is involved? As we saw with Green 
Garden, there was a more radical wing that had a 
desire for more extreme action which Shen had to 
temper in order to achieve his goals. That radical 
side can easily be the one calling the shots in an 
alternate scenario. The intentional ambiguity of 
China’s land laws can be “potentially explosive 
source for future social conflict.”30 It is up to the 
Chinese government to make sure that the rule of 
law is more effectively enforced at the local levels. 
They also need to clarify their land laws so that 
ownership is more clearly defined and these 
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conflicts do not erupt over preserving green space 
which should be publically owned. We have seen 
the bounds in this scenario for how far the 
government let the protesters proceed. The 
protesters operation within the laws and used the 
laws as their justification for their actions. Even in 
a society where the rule of law is weak it is hard for 
the government to ignore that these laws were 
clearly being broken. When the local government 
failed to stop the protesters they tried to turn the 
issue into a political matter. By trying to drag the 
issue of what is allowed into the area of what is not 
allowed, the government wanted to delegitimize the 
protests but failed to cast the protests in that light. 
By the end of this case study it is clear how the 
government sets the political arena and how far the 
people can go without retribution.   
 
Case Study #2: Illegal NGO Activism in the 
Shanghai Jiangwan Marshlands 
 
This second case study expands its scope and 
examines the Jiangwan marshlands issue at the 
regional level during 2002. Shanghai one of the 
largest cities in China and the world with a 
population of over 17.8 million people.31 Even 
more so when compared to the rest of China, 
Shanghai has gone through tremendous economic 
growth transforming into an economic hub for the 
rest of the country. Many politicians use municipal 
office in Shanghai as a stepping stone for higher 
positions within the central government based on 
their performance. Criteria for these promotions 
include wealth creation and economic growth so 
these goals quickly became the top priority for 
policymakers. Though impressive, this economic 
growth leads to many negative externalities with 
environmental destruction being one of the most 
prominent. This has led to the creation of many 
advocacy organizations throughout the city 
designed to address environmental and other 
concerns. In 1999 the very well-financed Shanghai 
Bureau of Civil Organizations was created as an 
extension of the Shanghai Bureau of Civil Affairs. 
This Bureau is charged with identifying and 
suppressing (if need be) those organizations and 
individuals who might challenge the aims of the 
government. If a civil society organization wants to 
be recognized, then they have to apply to the 
bureau for approval before it can exist legally. The 
government uses this ability as a tool since they can 
“prevent the development of NGOs by not 
                                                             
31 Xie, Lei. “Environmental Activism in China,” 128. 
providing them legal status.”32 With all of these 
barriers and regulations it is very difficult to 
maintain and operate NGOs in Shanghai. 
Though in this case study Shanghai is 
portrayed as being environmentally irresponsible 
regarding the marshlands, the municipality has 
attempted to improve the environment to a limited 
degree. The municipality made great strides in 
improving water quality, air quality, waste disposal 
and greenery since the 1990s and hopes to become 
an ecological city by 2020.33 Enforcement of 
environmental regulations is left to the Shanghai 
Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPB). The 
SEPB has the ability to compel business to follow 
regulations or be fined like it has done to thousands 
of entities since its creation. It uses some of this 
revenue to invest in environmental protection inside 
the city. In addition to this bureau the municipality 
has set up an “Environmental Protection and 
Ecological Construction Coordinating Committee,” 
the first of its kind in all of China.34 City officials 
of the highest levels sit on the committee including 
the Mayor and the Vice-Mayors. This makes 
implementation of the committee’s decisions fairly 
efficient since government agencies know that 
these decisions come directly from the top. 
Shanghai has been ranked number one among all 
other cities in China for its environmental 
protection efforts. All of these things, though still 
falling short of what is needed in order to guarantee 
a safe and clean environment for Shanghai’s 
residents, are still significant since they go further 
than what is implemented in other areas of China. 
The municipal government has made a 
concentrated effort to improve the environmental 
status of the city. The money used for 
environmental protection can go to other places that 
would promote development showing that Chinese 
political interests are more complex. The fact that 
the highest officials in the city have put the issue as 
a fairly high priority is also significant since in this 
case study it seems like the opposite is being done. 
It provides a basis for advocates to negotiate with 
the city for tougher environmental protection rules 
since there is a clear precedent for them. Though as 
seen with this case study, there are limits to how far 
Shanghai goes to protect the environment. 
Despite the restrictions, many NGOs as well 
as many Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) exist 
within Shanghai. Most of the ENGOs that do exist 
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are permitted to do so because they do not pose a 
threat to the government. The ENGO that we are 
specifically studying in this case is the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) Shanghai. Globally, WWF 
has many networks of supporters in many different 
countries and regional branches. Its main goals are 
the restoration and, as it is in this case, conservation 
of wildlife and green space. In China there are 
several regional organizations with WWF China 
based in Beijing. Most of the regional and local 
branches of WWF China operate independently 
from each other which are largely due to the nature 
of China’s government system. The NGOs that 
operate do so at the good graces of the CCP which 
would try to thwart any large, centralized national 
NGO network. This forces NGOs to operate in the 
decentralized, autonomous way that WWF China 
operates. WWF Shanghai has around 1000 
members listed but really has only a few dozen who 
are active.35 At the time of the Jiangwan incident 
they had not registered officially as a legal NGO so 
their current status was an illegal organization. 
Their activities are actually fairly limited to 
meeting together and bird watching at various 
places outside and around Shanghai and not the 
activism one would expect from such an so that’s 
why they decided not to register.36 Members mostly 
communicate on the WWF Shanghai’s website to 
organize meetings and expeditions. By its nature, 
this ENGO is fairly unorganized in its internal 
structure. Again this is a product of the illegal 
nature of this organization, by organizing the 
internal structure of the ENGO it would risk the 
government attempting to clamp down on it. It has 
also prevented WWF Shanghai from increasing its 
links with other NGOs in the area to coordinate 
activities. 
The Jiangwan marshlands were originally 
inhabited by an airport built for the Chinese 
military before occupying its role as an important 
green space in Shanghai. After many years of 
municipal growth for Shanghai and with the 
construction of other airbases, the airport became 
strategically irrelevant. During the 1970s, the area 
was turned into a marshland and control was given 
to the Shanghai municipal government. Due to the 
lack of human disturbance, the area was 
transformed into a haven for the city’s wildlife. 
There are a large amount of flora and fauna that 
live there and it is a breeding ground for 90% of the 
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city’s birds.37 Due to the area’s large size (about 
1% of the city’s area) and location within Shanghai, 
the municipal government wanted to transform it 
into a residential community. Considering its 
importance for the city’s wildlife, especially its bird 
population, WWF Shanghai took the leadership in 
trying to stop this development from occurring.  
The activists encountered many barriers to 
effectively reach out to others outside their 
organization for support. The first was to assemble 
a report on the environmental impact of destroying 
the marshlands. Very few scientists wished to put 
their name on anything which would indicate that 
they cooperated with an illegal organization.38 
Eventually, WWF Shanghai was able to get one of 
its own activists with a scientific background to 
write one. The NGO attempted to reach out to other 
organizations like the Grassroots Community as 
well as various student groups which were met with 
failure. Many of these groups thought their legal 
status would be threatened if they cooperated with 
an illegal group. Others were instructed by the 
municipal government specifically to take no action 
on this issue. The only groups who were willing to 
participate were those other web based groups like 
Shanghai Nomad Cub and the Common Wealth 
Management Project.39 
WWF Shanghai and their partners attempted 
to use mass media to attract attention to their fight 
to protect marshlands. They attempted to contact 
journalists but the municipal government put 
pressure on the news agencies leading to only a few 
stories to be produced on the issue. Eventually the 
media stopped reporting on their situation all 
together. The only other option for these groups 
was to use the internet in order to raise awareness. 
This strategy that WWF Shanghai was forced to use 
was actually fairly effective at getting their 
message out since a large number of Shanghai 
residents had access to the internet.40  They used 
the forums on their partner groups like the Nomad 
Club and Common Wealth to report on the 
destruction. The amount of visitors being routed to 
the WWF Shanghai website kept rising so 
dramatically that the government had to shut down 
the website all together. Though the damage was 
done and public opinion had already started to turn 
against the government.  
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Because of the notoriety of the Jiangwan 
Marshland campaign after several months of online 
campaigning, more of Shanghai’s citizens started to 
become involved in the project. Many different 
environmental experts were organized to offer their 
opinions on destruction of the marshlands at a level 
that was not possible before. An online petition 
against the construction was started and got the 
signatures from over 1000 people.41 It wasn’t long 
before several members of the Shanghai Municipal 
People’s Congress began to support the activist’s 
aims. They thought that perhaps it was a good idea 
to possibly consider making Jiangwan a nature 
preserve. When the SMPC met for the next time all 
construction was stopped on the marshland. This 
was significant because “for the first time, the 
public, led by activists, scholars, and political 
representatives, had successfully influenced 
government policy.” The public was able to lead to 
an outcome that wouldn’t have happened through 
“institutionalized policy channels.”42  
Despite the initial victory, there were still 
elements within the Shanghai municipal 
government who wished to develop the marshlands. 
First, the government targeted the scientists who 
supported the movement and were able to make 
them back down by pressuring them through their 
universities. The media was also more closely 
scrutinized to make sure that there was no more 
mention of the activists work. As the influence of 
the movement started to fade, the government 
conducted their own surveys to test public support 
over the marshland construction. They were able to 
produce an opinion outcome that was favorable for 
construction on the marshlands. This was done after 
a large public relations push on the side of the 
government who issued articles and news reports 
favorable to the construction in the media. 
Eventually, the government issued a new 
development plan for the marshlands which only 
preserved 200 square meters. WWF Shanghai was 
not able to meet its goals or objectives at preserving 
this critical green space within Shanghai.  
 
Analysis and Policy Prescriptions 
 
The PRC uses the system of NGO regulation 
as a way to control civil society within its borders. 
The process of recognition for NGOs is essential 
for this control to be effective since the government 
can basically decide which organizations it wants to 
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see operate. The existing NGOs are essentially 
beholden not to its members but rather to the 
government itself. “The Party monopolizes the 
legitimate channels of interest articulation and 
aggregation”43 so their message has to agree with 
the party’s. Since they decide if an organization is 
recognized or unrecognized, the organizations have 
a very limited arena where they can operate. If their 
issue is too controversial or political in nature then 
they will get shut down. NGOs literally have to live 
in a state of fear because any misstep might lead 
them to be de-recognized. This is why they were so 
averse to assisting WWF Shanghai since the 
government might act against them. De-recognition 
would mean that they would not be able to grow 
too large, advertise extensively, advocate for too 
many issues, or have many activities. Essentially, 
they would have to operate as a small, 
decentralized, and unorganized group much like 
WWF Shanghai did before they advocated for the 
Jiangwan marshlands. These NGOs “lack the 
organizational capacity to implement even 
medium-scale projects on their own.”44 They have 
to reach out and collaborate with others which is 
difficult if you are unrecognized because of the 
stigma attached to it. As an alternative, the 
government often times tries to set up NGOs which 
have its leaders on the government payroll. They 
use the excuse that they want to eliminate 
“unproductive competition” between NGOs when 
what they really want to do is achieve control.45 
Just like business, the government wants to be able 
to control all areas of society in China so the most 
favorable outcome for the CCP is assured. One 
would ask why the government spends so much 
time suppressing organizations that are of a non-
political nature. It is because these organizations 
“enhance individuals’ capacity for collective 
political action.”46 They enable individuals to 
advocate for non-political issues which give them 
this experience for pushing for government change. 
By having all of these organizations providing this 
advocacy training to its population, in the future it 
can be directed towards political issues like voting 
and civil rights. Since political mobilization is one 
of the CCP’s major fears, it is only natural that they 
clamp down on these NGOs.  
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Another interesting phenomenon that this case 
study exposes was the use of the media and the 
internet to mobilize opposition to the project. Since 
the structure of WWF Shanghai is very loose and 
decentralized, the internet gave it the perfect 
medium to communicate with supporters. It was 
able to organize meetings of people to discuss the 
issue and come to a consensus on a plan of action. 
More importantly, it provided a medium of 
communication that was an alternative to the state 
run media. When the opposition to the marshlands 
got too threatening to the municipal government’s 
plans, they ordered the media to stop reporting on 
it. This meant that the group’s website and its 
partner’s websites were the only way to inform the 
public about the marshland issue. With the media 
reports being skewed by the government the 
internet posed a contradiction to the official 
account of what was going on. The members of 
WWF Shanghai were able to, through their website, 
“offer alternative perspectives on events from those 
provided by other media.”47 Since most Chinese 
citizens are aware of the government’s role in the 
press, they might be more inclined to believe what 
they see on the web from independent sources. 
Suddenly, the PRC’s stranglehold on the media and 
official communication is loosened by the internet. 
WWF Shanghai even got a petition signed by over 
1000 Shanghai residents which assisted in getting a 
temporary halt on the project. As was seen with the 
first case study, petitions are an effective and 
mostly legal tool for citizens to register their 
discontent. But why is the CCP so afraid of this 
activity which ultimately made them close down 
the website? It is what Howard Rheingold describes 
as the internet’s “democratizing potential.”48 This 
potential comes from where the fast transfer of 
information between millions of individuals can 
lead to. If citizens can communicate 
instantaneously and organize themselves to 
advocate for environmental issues, why not for 
democratic rights as well? It is the same dilemma 
as the NGOs pose; their work and experience given 
onto citizens for non-political issues can easily be 
turned onto political issues. The internet threatens 
to “transform their more traditional forms of 
political behavior” into that which can directly 
oppose the government.49 With the rising amount of 
Chinese citizens who have access to the internet 
this can be extremely dangerous for the regime. 
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Shanghai is a perfect example of this potential since 
it has a very large internet savvy population.  
This case study shows that even within a 
certain level of government in the PRC, there are a 
variety of interests and actions at work at one time. 
Certain members of the SMPC were sympathetic to 
the people’s cause of protecting the marshlands. 
WWF Shanghai’s petitions and scientific studies 
were able to convince the Congress that the 
marshlands needed more examination before it was 
built on. Though the council was able to effectively 
stop the construction, there were other interests in 
the mayor’s office, the city planning board and 
other municipal institutions which wanted to see it 
continue. The higher officials in the government, 
by the system’s nature, are more worried about 
developing the area and advancing their economic 
goals so they can get posted to higher positions by 
the central CCP. This shows that even in a city 
where the environment does place as a high 
priority, development still wins. It is economic 
progress that ultimately gets one promoted, not 
progress on protecting the environment. Because 
the interests of the different levels of the municipal 
government diverge with the more powerful ones in 
favor of development, ultimately the builders won.  
The PRC needs to ease its restrictions on NGO 
registration and development in order to properly 
address the environmental concerns of its citizens. 
In a state such as China, there is no democratic 
citizen-government feedback loop for people to air 
their grievances and express their concerns. NGOs 
provide an alternative to that loop by providing a 
collective voice for issues of the population. By 
cutting that alternative out of the picture, citizens 
lack a mechanism to register their disagreements 
with government policy and mismanagement which 
could become a potentially explosive issue. By 
keeping the cap on civil society, China’s goal of 
political stability could be undermined as 
environmental problems get even worse and 
increasingly dissatisfied people have no outlet for 
their concerns. The government has “limited 
NGO’s usefulness as champions of interests and 
values different from that of the government.”50 By 
restricting NGOs, the PRC misses an opportunity to 
use them for their non-advocacy benefits as well. 
Plenty of NGOs do work in environmental cleanup, 
conservation activities, and environmental 
management which would go a long way to helping 
China cope with its environmental issues. Without 
the opening up of the registration system there will 
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be few national networks of NGOs and little 
cooperation between them. This is required for any 
healthy society to flourish as China becomes more 
urbanized and its citizens look for these 
organizations to fill certain gaps. 
At first, WWF Shanghai as an illegal NGO 
was able to work around many barriers that the 
government imposed with registration like 
cooperation with others, media and the internet. But 
in the end the government was able to halt its 
activities by cutting off its institutional links and 
outlets for organization. At this point in China, it 
would be extremely difficult for illegal NGOs to 
succeed in advocacy efforts because of the 
government can easily stop them from operating. 
The internet became a useful tool for WWF 
Shanghai in mobilizing supporters and spreading 
their message. It is difficult for the government to 
keep track of all traffic on the web which allowed 
even an illegal NGO to succeed for so long. The 
fact that they almost succeeded in getting the 
project completely stopped could provide a strategy 
for other illegal NGOs to use. Certainly for a legal 
NGO these benefits would accrue quicker with an 
established network of supporters and more range 
to operate due to its status. Despite WWF 
Shanghai’s limited success, it ultimate failed 
because of their lack of recognition and the benefits 
afforded from that. In order for the NGO society to 
operate effectively and accurately reflect the 
people’s interests, China will have to deregulate its 
NGO sector and allow for freer access to the 
internet. 
 
Case Study #3: Environmental Activism from 
Beijing to the Nu River 
 
Beijing, like Shanghai and many other cities in 
China has experienced extremely fast growth over 
the past couple decades. Also like many other 
Chinese cities, it has a very poor environmental 
protection record with serious air and water 
pollution problems.51 It wasn’t until the 2000s 
when Beijing sought to improve its pollution 
problem culminating in a fierce campaign right 
before the 2008 Olympic Games. Unlike in other 
regions, Beijing has been fairly tolerant of ENGOs 
operating within the city. The Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) has openly 
declared their support for many such institutions 
and has even cooperated with them in the past. It 
has even included their participation in 
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Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) which 
are issued before building on projects commences. 
Part of this reason was an effort by the MEP to 
achieve more influence on the EIA process where it 
is often eclipsed by other economically oriented 
ministries.52 After 56 ENGO’s issued a letter in 
2005 which supported the MEP’s growing 
influence on the EIA process, an informal 
partnership was established between these two 
groups. This ultimately led to the establishment of 
the regulation “Provisional Measures for Public 
Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment” 
in 2006 which was the “first legal document that 
enables the participation of the public in 
environmental policy-making process.”53      
A large number of public ENGOs exist in 
Beijing and foster a community of organizations 
which are able to advocate for their interests. They 
have their roots in the 1990’s with the 
establishment of the first ENGO, Friends of Nature, 
in 1993. An offshoot of that NGO, the Green 
Environmental Volunteers (GEV), is the ENGO 
that we will be studying in this case study. After the 
turn of the century the amount of ENGOs increased 
dramatically after feeding off of existing 
organizations and enjoying increasing support from 
the MEP. Student green organizations also become 
prominent which fed into larger organizations after 
graduation. ENGOs in Beijing have had a large 
degree of cooperation by “sharing information, 
organizing workshops,  launching programs 
collectively to achieve stronger influence” etc.54 
The GEV in particular was one of the most 
prominent ENGOs in Beijing. They had almost 200 
permanent members with a volunteer and advocacy 
network of over 30,000 people.55 It is well 
connected and has led a number of campaigns with 
other NGOs before. Despite its loose organizational 
structure, its leadership of extremely motivated 
individuals enables it to be successful.  
The GEV took a leadership role in opposing 
the decision to build a large scale damming project 
on the Nu River. The Nu river flows through 
Yunnan province into Myanmar and is one of the 
last large rivers to not to be dammed in China. 
Surrounding it is a natural World Heritage Site 
where much of China’s biodiversity lies with 79 
rare or endangered species making their home 
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there.56 The project entailed building 13 hydro-
election power stations at various points on the 
river generating 3.64 million kilowatts which is 
more than ever the Three Gorges Dam.57 Due to the 
environmental impact of the dam, which would 
disturb much of the wildlife and plant species in the 
area, there was quite a lot of opposition to the 
project. The MEP and a group of ENGOs were 
opposed to the project and tried to organize 
meetings and make the public aware of the 
downsides of this project. The National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
was on the other side of the issue claiming that the 
benefits of this badly needed power generation 
outweigh the downsides. The controversy over the 
project was able to push the projected start date 
past 2003 giving the ENGOs a chance to step up 
their campaign against the dams. 
NGO partnerships between the GEV and local 
Yunnan organizations were crucial in opposing the 
dam project. In Kunming, the capital of Yunnan, 
the ENGO Green Watershed was the primary 
organization in opposition to the project. Support 
locally was weak for Green Watershed because the 
provincial government cracked down on potential 
partnerships by restricting media reporting as well 
as by other means. Upon interviewing leaders of 
other NGOs, it was discovered that their lack of 
participation was due to concerns over their status 
which could be under threat if the oppose the 
government.58 Due to this lack of support, Green 
Watershed was forced to turn to GEV, a Beijing 
based NGO in the hope of assistance. GEV was 
very willing to assist in advocating against such a 
potentially damaging project and was able to get 
several of its partners involved in the fight. Because 
restrictions on the ENGO culture in Beijing were 
relatively loose, many of the leaders of the different 
organizations in the city had very developed 
guanxi, or influential networks of influence.59 In 
addition to the NGO sector, GEV’s leaders were 
able to use their guanxi with the MEP to coordinate 
action.  
Once these partnerships were made between 
regional and Beijing NGOs they started to act to 
preserve the watershed. The MEP attempted to get 
a serious EIA of the project but it was stonewalled 
by supporters within the government. Many in the 
MEP increasingly turned toward the ENGO sector 
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by providing them with updates and information in 
order to help them advocate strongly for the area’s 
preservation in ways that they could not.60 The 
GEV was then able to use this information to report 
this issue in the media and get scientists to support 
their environmental claims. Through both 
organizations, scientists in both Beijing, and locally 
in Yunnan were contacted to offer their opinion 
through both on the ground assessments and 
reports.  The MEP could then turn around and say 
the original EIA of the site was biased because of 
the clear opposition of all these scientists without 
seeming like it was instigating a coalition against 
the government. The media was also able to publish 
many of these opinions in both public newspapers 
and, most significantly, the daily newspaper for the 
CCP. This newspaper had a real significant impact 
on policy makers which was a major achievement 
for the movement since their goal was not only to 
reach a public consensus against the building but 
that of the government as well. Eventually the GEV 
organized a trip for journalists to the area where 
they got to see the environmental as well as social 
impact of the project. It was a big concern that over 
50,000 people would have to be moved from their 
homes as a result of the dams.61 The more media 
coverage the issue got the more support from the 
public, government, and other ENGOS the anti-
building side received. 
As public support continued to rise against the 
dam building, the actions of the ENGO coalition 
intensified in 2004. They conducted a series of 
photo exhibitions at several universities, in a 
supermarket, post office, and an office building 
showing the Nu river watershed. They even created 
a website called “Nu River Sentiment” where 
people could pledge their support for the region’s 
preservation.62 More scientific studies were 
published and presented at conferences nationally 
and internationally. The coalition even got 
international support from NGOs further downriver 
from the dams. 80 NGOs in Thailand and Laos 
wrote letters protesting the project and sent them to 
the Chinese embassy in Thailand.63 In the end, due 
to a combination of pressures, the government 
continued to push off the project with no definite 
start date for construction at present time.   
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Analysis and Policy Prescriptions 
 
The success of the Green Environmental 
Volunteers was significant in both the size and 
scope of the Nu River dam project. The GEV was a 
legal NGO so therefore it had more room to operate 
than the illegal NGO we saw in the first case study, 
WWF Shanghai. The advantages afforded to it 
because of its status were obvious. It was allowed 
to use the internet and reach out to the public 
without being clamped down upon. Organizations 
were able to partner up with it without fear of 
reprisals from the government. It was even allowed 
to cooperate with the Environmental Protection 
Ministry which would have been forbidden if the 
GEV was an illegal group. Without these benefits 
the campaign probably would not have been able to 
attract as much public attention. The media was 
allowed to report on the issue as much as it wanted 
as long as it didn’t openly challenge the 
government. Journalists were not as afraid as 
approaching the NGO and the government did not 
stop news stories from being published. 
The GEV was permitted to operate as it did 
partially because of the lack of crackdown from the 
Beijing government. Even though it had legal 
status, the government might have been able to try 
to shut it down by other means but it didn’t. The Nu 
river dam project was of the utmost national 
significance and posed an opportunity to greatly 
increase China’s power generation capacity. The 
potential of this project was more than that of the 
Three Gorges Dam, arguably China’s most 
important infrastructure project. Part of the reason 
that this crackdown didn’t happen was because of 
the central government’s new priorities for 
environmental protection. It was discovered that 
“environmental pollution cost China 511.8 billion 
Yuan (USD64 billion) in economic losses, 
accounting for 3.05 per cent of the country's GDP 
in 2004.”64 This only quantifies what China has 
known for years which were that these problems 
were hurting China’s economic growth and the 
problem was getting worse. If China was to 
maintain its high growth levels it had to deal with 
these problems. It also had to tackle many of its 
problems due to its expected accession to the WTO 
and in preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games. 
Because these organizations were located within 
Beijing, central government and the city’s policies 
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often overlapped. Since environmental protection 
was acceptable to the central government up until a 
point, these NGOs were permitted to operate 
extensively. 
The establishment of the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection is a step in the right 
direct yet shows some unsettling aspects of Chinese 
environmental policy. The Ministry was a relatively 
new creation when it was created as the State 
Environmental Protection Administration in 1998 
when environmental protection in China became a 
larger priority.65 As seen in this case study, it began 
to partner up with NGOs in the early to mid-2000s 
to help advance its goals. Part of the reason that this 
cooperation with civil society was needed was 
because it “lacks the money, staff, and power to 
override local leaders and to shut down polluters.”66 
Unable to achieve its goals itself because of the 
lack of resources, it had to turn to these sectors. The 
information that it provided to GEV was crucial in 
allowing scientists to compile reports claiming the 
marshland construction was damaging. In giving 
them support, the MEP was able to use the GEV to 
force the opinion of the public against the opinion 
of more powerful ministries like the NDRC. 
Elevating environmental protection to ministry 
level should not give the impression that it has 
achieved the same priority level as the NDRC 
which has equal status. The MEV is handicapped at 
the start because “environmental protection often 
loses to the more attractive goal of economic 
development.”67 With economic growth still 
remaining the top priority for the government, 
ministries like the NDRC will always have more 
resources and capabilities than the MEV. In a way 
this will continue to strengthen the NGO 
community since the state will have to continue to 
turn to “non -state actors to carry some of the 
environmental protection burden.”68 Because of this 
increasing role of ENGOs in environmental 
protection, it leads to new regulations passed to 
legitimize public participation in EIAs. The MEP’s 
support of the ENGO community has been essential 
to its growth and to its protections efforts. 
This Nu River damming issue exposes the 
stark difference between different agencies within 
the central government. The MEP has shown a 
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remarkable amount of independence from the goals 
of economic policy planners within the PRC. It has 
been able to raise environmental concerns up to a 
point where their opinion is recognized as a 
legitimate consideration in the construction process. 
Much of the time this opinion is ignored but it is 
still significant progress since it is the starting point 
for further advancements. There is still a long way 
to go before it reaches the power levels of the 
NDRC who was starkly opposed to the project. The 
bureaucratic power struggle between the two 
ministries shows that the supposedly monolithic 
power structure of the Chinese government is not 
even true at the central level. Both agencies were 
ultimately engaged in a fight to convince policy 
makers that their position is the most legitimate. In 
this case, because public opinion was so strong 
because of the environmental damage, the 
“ecological impact” vs. “growth of the local 
economy and the increase in national energy” 
argument landed on the side of the environment.69 
Unfortunately this is a rarity because more often the 
side of the NDRC wins out making this victory 
more significant.  
The PRC needs to strengthen its institutional 
capacity for environmental enforcement in order for 
the environment to be properly protected. The 
creation of the ministry is significant, but it still 
does not mean that its goals will be met. The 
government needs to give the MEP the capabilities 
to enforce environmental regulations and review 
projects more closely. This will not happen unless a 
number of changes happen to the ministry, 
including raising the numbers of employment from 
its current number which is one-eighth the size of 
the US Environmental Protection Agency.70 
Previously it was mentioned that this lack of 
support has strengthened the ENGO community by 
forcing the MEP to turn to them for assistance but a 
strengthening would also help the community. By 
giving the MEP the resources to accomplish its 
mission, it would strengthen the causes of these 
ENGOs by giving their positions more legitimacy 
from a branch of the government. The relationship 
between the ENGOs and MEP has already been 
established so it would be unlikely that it would be 
diminished just because one side’s power 
capabilities have been enhanced especially since 
they would be working in tandem.  ENGOs need to 
continue to exploit the differences between 
branches of the government to help them succeed. 
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By combining this with favorable public opinion 
for preserving the Nu River watershed, the GEV 
was able to preserve the region for the time being. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The three case studies in this paper reveal 
several interesting developments in how the 
government and NGOs interact in the realm of the 
environment. One of the most significant is haw 
different levels of government as well as different 
institutions inside those levels have such a variety 
of interests and methods for dealing with 
environmental activism. In our first case study we 
see a lower level of government (local) ignoring the 
regulations of the higher level of government 
(municipal) in order to build on park lands. The 
local level of government was able to influence the 
bureaucracy enough that they were willing to 
ignore the regulations as well. One would expect 
that rules coming from a higher level of 
government to a lower level of government in an 
authoritarian, one-party state to be followed no 
matter what but that are clearly not the case. 
Among other factors, once the higher levels of 
government was informed about this lack of 
adherence they put pressure on the local 
government to shut the project down. In the second 
case study at the municipal level of Shanghai there 
was a stark difference not between levels of 
government but among the same level of 
government. The Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Congress actually was able to delay the project for 
a time. They thought the project should be 
reevaluated before construction proceeded against 
the wishes of the higher officials within the city 
government. Ultimately the wishes of these higher 
officials were able to win out since the process 
went along. In the last case study there was a 
difference between two branches of the central 
government between the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection and the National Development and 
Reform Commission. The MEP wanted the Nu 
River project stopped and the NDRC wanted it to 
continue with both ministries trying to influence 
policy makers. These branches of the bureaucracy 
were literally competing for influence in order to 
advance their respective goals. Though the Chinese 
government operates in a one-party state the 
interests of the top do not necessarily lead to the 
desired outcomes at the bottom. This is because as 
we have seen with the case studies, every branch 
and level of government has goals and interests that 
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they try to serve and they vary enough that 
differing outcomes will manifest. 
Activists have tried a number of strategies to 
overcome barriers that the PRC has placed to block 
their activism. Shen, an individual in the first case 
study was able to motivate his neighbors to activate 
for a purely local concern. He was able to use the 
actual laws of the state which forbade construction 
to validate his position. This made it difficult for 
government officials to argue with him or shut his 
protests down because they were using actual laws 
of the state to “authenticate” his position. He 
framed their protests as simply protecting the 
resident’s environmental rights which was 
extremely effective. When their interests were 
ignored, on two separate occasions Shen ordered 
that the protesters take down first the wall, and then 
the scaffolding at the site in an orderly manner. It 
was important that they did not destroy anything 
and that they did this on the basis of the law 
because if not, this protest would not have been 
tolerated. He was able to make the government 
afraid of their potential violence but not of any 
outward real violence which would have gotten 
them imprisoned. In Beijing, legal NGOs like the 
Green Environmental Volunteers had more leeway 
to operate. They were able to form direct 
partnerships with the MEP which was a district 
branch of the government. The MEP was even able 
to send it information regarding the project 
enabling them to have scientists rally against the 
Nu River damn. Though rare, these partnerships 
with supporters in government are essential for 
NGOs to exploit. Since they are legitimate voices 
in policy making circles, they are able to influence 
decisions. In the case of Beijing, the MEP had 
enough strength to make a difference in that 
advocacy situation. The GEV was able to raise 
public opinion through the media and the internet 
and let the public know how destructive the project 
would be. Because the MEP coupled with NGOs 
who were able to get public opinion on their side, 
this greatly enhanced their power so that they could 
compete with the more powerful ministries like the 
NDRC. Another advantage that the GEV had in this 
situation was the ability to form connections with 
other NGOs. Since the zeal for environmental 
protection was so high at the time and Beijing was 
going through a period of relative loosening, this 
was possible. The GEV was able to use other 
Beijing NGOs to assist them at building public 
opinion through their guanxi, or personal 
connections. They were even able to assist local 
NGOs who exist in more unfavorable climates to 
advocate for the construction to not proceed. 
Forming these networks of cooperation is necessary 
for effective national opposition to environmental 
projects to succeed. 
While there were many strategies that were 
effective at advancing the environmentalist’s goals 
there were also many others that were met with 
mixed results. The efforts of WWF Shanghai were 
the most prevalent in this case. They were an illegal 
NGO that never applied for recognition because 
they never needed to. When the issue for the 
protection of the Jiangwan marshlands became 
apparent, they attempted to advocate for its 
protection but instead were met with a clampdown 
from the government. They did attempt to use the 
media and the internet as tools for promoting their 
issues. Shanghai as well as many other parts of 
China is increasingly connected to the internet 
giving them access to more information. Because of 
this, WWF Shanghai, an illegal NGO was able to 
be successful for a short time even after the 
government stopped media reporting on the issue. 
They could organize meetings to come to a 
scientific consensus and also get petitions signed by 
other citizens. Their online efforts were almost 
effective when the SMPC ordered a stop on their 
construction efforts. At the same time the internet 
offers many advantages for the green movement, it 
also gives them several vulnerabilities. The 
government was able to shut down WWF 
Shanghai’s internet outlet and succeed at getting 
their project built because public opinion started to 
fade. With the GEV environmental activism online 
was permitted because they were a legal NGO but 
that is not always guaranteed to be the case if the 
government feels threatened. Nevertheless, the use 
of the internet is an effective tool for both illegal 
and legal NGOs. Ultimately if NGOs want to 
succeed at their activism in the long term, they will 
need this legal status to function effectively. The 
politicization of environmental concerns was also a 
big issue as was seen in the first case study. The 
government tried to drag the activism into the 
political realm as Shen tried to keep it nonpolitical. 
They almost succeeded at stopping his movement 
but because of Shen’s persistence at keeping the 
issue centered on the environment, they were able 
to succeed. For the time being activists will have to 
make sure that their activism is kept in this non-
political realm until there is a widespread political 
change within the PRC. 
The PRC needs to embrace a number of 
reforms in order for it to better cope with 
environmental activism. Firstly, it needs to ensure a 
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greater rule of law within the bureaucracy and 
government. Regulations should be followed no 
matter what politicians and party members try to 
say to influence it. This is the only way that 
environmental regulations will be ensured to be 
effective at all levels and not be controlled by 
special interests. This move towards greater rule of 
law has other benefits for the PRC like greater 
efficiency and it seems that it is moving generally 
in that direction. The party would still ultimately be 
able to write what regulations which would be 
followed so nothing to far outside their interests 
would be done. The PRC also needs to lift the 
restrictions that it places on NGO registration in 
order for civil society to flourish and the interests 
of the people be properly reflected. Understandably 
these NGOs represent a threat to the regime since 
they give them activist training. But, in order to 
assist the state in identifying polluters and without 
the collaboration from NGOs to protect China’s 
environment, the state’s environmental needs will 
be difficult to meet. The government also needs to 
strengthen the MEP to make it able to compete with 
other ministries. Of course, economic interests will 
trump environmental ones for a long time. More 
money, resources and staff will still go far in 
ensuring that the MEP has more of an ability to 
articulate its interests. Many of these reforms would 
be beneficial, but China is only likely to implement 
them in a limited manner in the short term. 
Ultimately what is necessary for China to have 
truly effective environmental activism would be an 
open political system and competitive democracy. 
Since this will not happen anytime soon, China 
needs to implement several of these reforms in 
order to effectively deal with environmental 
concerns of its citizens. Like mentioned before, 
environmental problems have explosive potential if 
they continue to deteriorate which represent 
“destabilizing factors” for the government. This is 
why the PRC has decided to take up environmental 
protection as one of its top concerns. Though 
commendable, they have not gone far enough in 
ensuring this protection leading to so much 
activism. These activists have met much resistance 
and encountered many failures but at the same time 
many successes as well. Jonathan Schwartz writes 
that “China's environmental non-governmental 
organization community-arguably the most 
advanced manifestation of Chinese civil society.” 
In this role, environmental activists have the 
potential to define how civil society as a whole 
grows and changes in China into the future. 
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